Packages / simple-git / Security

HighVulnerabilityGHSA-858h-whjf-mvg5CVE-2026-102827Published 5 Oct 2026

simple-git: unsafe-operations plugin bypass via git long-option abbreviation (--receive-p/--exe) -> command execution (residual of CVE-2026-28291)

Your version

Affected releases · simple-git

  • 3.x3.0.1 – 3.36.0No fix on this line yet
  • 2.x and older0.0.1 – 2.48.0No fix, no longer updated

3.x has no fix yet; the newest fixed line:

npm install simple-git@4.0.0
Every release on a timeline
4.x
  1. Not affected

    4.0.0 – 4.1.0

    4 releases, latest

3.x
  1. Affected

    3.0.1 – 3.36.0

    52 releases

2.x
  1. Affected

    2.0.0 – 2.48.0

    63 releases

1.x
  1. Affected

    1.0.0 – 1.132.0

    139 releases

0.x
  1. Affected

    0.0.1 – 0.17.0

    20 releases

278 stable releases of simple-git, oldest to newest, one row per major.

What happens

simple-git's blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin blocks dangerous git options (--upload-pack/--receive-pack/--exec/...) unless the consumer opts in via unsafe:{allowUnsafePack:true}. Detection (@simple-git/argv-parser detectVulnerableFlags) matches the parsed flag NAME against literal-spelling patterns: /--(upload|receive)-pack/ (requires the literal '-pack') and the string '--exec'. But git accepts unambiguous prefix abbreviations of long options, and expandToken (token-expander.ts) returns the LITERAL token as flag.name (it uses the spec only for needsNext, never to canonicalize). So git push --receive-p=<cmd> parses with flag.name='--receive-p', which /--(upload|receive)-pack/ does NOT match, yet git expands --receive-p -> --receive-pack and runs <cmd> (on a local/file remote, locally). The clone side is robust (its '--u' substring rule catches every --upload* abbreviation); the push --receive-* and --exe* abbreviations have no equivalent rule and slip through.

Proof of concept (latest: simple-git 3.36.0, @simple-git/argv-parser 1.1.1, default unsafe plugin ON): Gate vulnerabilityCheck: 'push --receive-pack=touch...' -> BLOCKED; 'push --receive-pa=touch...' and 'push --receive-p=touch...' -> BYPASS (empty vulns); '--exec=' BLOCKED, '--exe=' BYPASS. End-to-end via simpleGit().push(): CONTROL git.push(['../bare','HEAD:refs/heads/c','--receive-pack=touch /tmp/pwned_ctrl;']) -> throws GitPluginError 'Use of --upload-pack or --receive-pack is not permitted...'; no command runs. BYPASS git.push(['../bare','HEAD:refs/heads/e2e','--receive-p=touch /tmp/pwned_e2e;']) -> NO GitPluginError; /tmp/pwned_e2e CREATED (git executed the injected command); only a later GitError surfaces. Direct git confirms git push ../bare --receive-p='touch X;' HEAD:refs/heads/m and --exe='touch Y;' both execute on a local/path remote.

Impact: any app relying on simple-git's default unsafe-operations protection while passing attacker-influenced options/args into a git push (local/file remote, or attacker-influenced receive-pack target) can be made to execute arbitrary commands -- the exact protection CVE-2026-28291 provided, defeated by an abbreviated spelling. Same class/impact as GHSA-jcxm-m3jx-f287, on the push path.

Remediation: canonicalize git option abbreviations before matching (resolve to the canonical long name via the per-task flag spec in expandToken), or match on the option stem/prefix down to the shortest unambiguous form for push receive-pack/exec (mirroring the clone-side '--u' approach). Also audit --template and -c/config-write detection for the same abbreviation gap.

Credit: anir0y (independent security research).

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