Packages / @tanstack/start-storage-context / Security

Malicious packageMAL-2026-3492GHSA-66j2-5c8h-j3f7Published 12 May 2026

Malicious code in @tanstack/start-storage-context (npm)

Compromised versions · @tanstack/start-storage-context

  • 1.166.41
  • 1.166.38

Safe

Every other versionincluding the latest, 1.167.40

npm install @tanstack/start-storage-context@1.167.40

  1. Not affected

    1.129.0 – 1.166.35

    232 releases

  2. Affected

    1.166.38 – 1.166.41

    2 releases

  3. Safe

    1.167.0 – 1.167.40

    41 releases, latest

275 stable releases of @tanstack/start-storage-context, oldest to newest.

Is your project affected?

Paste your package.json, or type the range you declare for @tanstack/start-storage-context. It is read in your browser and sent nowhere.

What happens

If one of these versions was installed

  1. Treat the machines and CI runners that installed it as compromised.
  2. Rotate the npm, GitHub and cloud tokens they could reach.
  3. Reinstall from a lockfile that pins a version outside the list.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (e7021ac6b47d0f973f936ca9d15cd26f43a01b1151ce691ec8b10be5001be2bb)

This version of @tanstack/start-storage-context belongs to the @tanstack/* package family that was compromised via CI cache poisoning, with 42 packages republished in two malicious versions each on 2026-05-11. The campaign's structural fingerprints include: an undeclared multi-megabyte obfuscated JavaScript blob at the tarball root not listed in package.json's "files" array; an optionalDependencies entry pointing at a github: orphan-commit reference ("@tanstack/setup": "github:tanstack/router#<sha>") to smuggle a second-stage payload outside the npm registry; harvesting of cloud-provider metadata (AWS IMDS, GCP metadata, Kubernetes SA tokens), npm tokens from ~/.npmrc, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys; exfiltration over Session/Oxen (filev2.getsession.org, seed{1,2,3}.getsession.org) to defeat IP/domain blocking; second-stage fetch from litter.catbox.moe (anonymous 72-hour-TTL host); /proc/<pid>/mem scraping of the GitHub Actions runner's OIDC token to publish further malicious versions; and self-propagation via the npm maintainer-search API. Installing this version on a developer machine or CI runner exposes credentials, cloud metadata, and any reachable npm/GitHub publishing identities to the attacker.

Source: ghsa-malware (d5a0ae6d7087ec56fc2bc7f8be04f27f0d1f7f9d9e660b1969f0e790148dc627)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Source: google-open-source-security (5e1924464368f0c5816ee84e000cc47017f44045140feafbbc9e685d847ed5a5)

This package was compromised as part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud is back" worm by the TeamPCP threat actor.

The package will steal credentials and then propogate it to every package it has access to. The package also attempts to remain persistent.