Packages / @angular/ssr / Security

ModerateVulnerabilityGHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrjCVE-2026-27738Published 25 Feb 2026

Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix

Affected releases · @angular/ssr

  • 21.x21.0.0 – 21.1.4Fixed in 21.1.5
  • 20.x20.0.0 – 20.3.16Fixed in 20.3.17
  • 19.x19.0.0 – 19.2.20Fixed in 19.2.21

On 21.x, the newest line:

npm install @angular/ssr@21.1.5
22.x
  1. Not affected

    22.0.0 – 22.2.3

    24 releases, latest

21.x
  1. Affected

    21.0.0 – 21.1.4

    12 releases

  2. Fixed

    21.1.5 – 21.2.27

    29 releases

20.x
  1. Affected

    20.0.0 – 20.3.16

    34 releases

  2. Fixed

    20.3.17 – 20.3.40

    24 releases

19.x
  1. Affected

    19.0.0 – 19.2.20

    39 releases

  2. Fixed

    19.2.21 – 19.2.27

    7 releases

242 stable releases of @angular/ssr, oldest to newest, one row per major.

Is your project affected?

Paste your package.json, or type the range you declare for @angular/ssr. It is read in your browser and sent nowhere.

What happens

An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.

When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the X-Forwarded-Prefix header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., ///evil.com).

  1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router redirectTo or i18n locale switch).

  2. Angular receives ///evil.com as the prefix.

  3. It strips one slash, leaving //evil.com.

  4. The resulting string is used in the Location header.

  5. Modern browsers interpret // as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from https://your-app.com to https://evil.com.

Impact

This vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:

  • Scale: A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.

  • SEO Poisoning: Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.

  • Trust: Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.

Attack Preconditions

  • The application must use Angular SSR.

  • The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.

  • The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the X-Forwarded-Prefix header to the SSR process without sanitization.

  • The cache must not vary on the X-Forwarded-Prefix header.

Patches

  • 21.2.0-rc.1

  • 21.1.5

  • 20.3.17

  • 19.2.21

Workarounds

Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the X-Forwarded-Prefix header in theirserver.ts before the Angular engine processes the request:

app.use((req, res, next) => {
  const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim();
  if (prefix) {
    // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes
    req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\]+/, '/');
  }
  next();
});

Resources