Packages / renovate / Security
Renovate vulnerable to arbitrary command injection via Gradle Wrapper and malicious `distributionUrl`
Affected releases · renovate
- 42.x42.0.0 – 42.68.4Fixed in 42.68.5
- 41.x41.0.0 – 41.173.1No fix on this line yet
- 40.x and older32.124.0 – 40.62.1No fix, no longer updated
On 42.x, the newest line:
npm install renovate@42.68.5Every release on a timeline
Not affected
44.0.0 – 44.190.0
603 releases, latest
Affected
42.0.0 – 42.68.4
218 releases
Fixed
42.68.5 – 42.99.0
147 releases
Affected
41.0.0 – 41.173.1
571 releases
Affected
40.0.0 – 40.62.1
256 releases
Affected
39.0.0 – 39.264.1
684 releases
Affected
38.0.0 – 38.142.7
385 releases
Affected
37.0.0 – 37.440.7
1173 releases
Affected
36.0.0 – 36.109.4
311 releases
Affected
35.0.0 – 35.159.7
353 releases
Affected
34.0.0 – 34.160.0
394 releases
Affected
33.0.0 – 33.2.4
9 releases
Not affected
32.0.0 – 32.123.0
344 releases
Affected
32.124.0 – 32.241.11
286 releases
What happens
Summary
Renovate can be tricked into executing shell code while updating the Gradle Wrapper. A malicious distributionUrl in gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties can lead to command execution in the Renovate runtime.
Details
When Renovate handles Gradle Wrapper artifacts, it may run a wrapper update command such as:
./gradlew :wrapper --gradle-distribution-url <value>
In the observed behavior, Renovate executes this via a shell (e.g., /bin/sh -c ...).
If distributionUrl contains shell command substitution syntax like $(...), the shell evaluates it before Gradle validates/parses the URL.
After that, Gradle attempts to parse the URL as a URI and fails with URISyntaxException, but the shell substitution has already executed.
This is reproducible even when allowScripts is disabled (default is OFF), because this execution happens as part of Gradle Wrapper artifact handling rather than “repository install scripts”.
Prerequisites / attack conditions:
The attacker must be able to get a malicious
gradle-wrapper.propertiesinto a repository that Renovate scans (e.g., direct write access, or a maintainer merges an attacker’s change/PR).Renovate must be configured to process Gradle Wrapper updates/artifacts for that repository (default behavior for the Gradle Wrapper manager).
PoC
Create a repository with a Gradle Wrapper (
gradlew,gradlew.bat,gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar, andgradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties).Set
distributionUrlingradle-wrapper.propertiesto include$(...).Run Renovate against the repository.
Observe that a file is created during Renovate’s wrapper update step before Gradle fails with
URISyntaxException.
A screen recording is attached showing end-to-end reproduction. In the demo, the payload creates /tmp/passwd_dump containing /etc/passwd, demonstrating that file read/exfiltration is possible within the Renovate execution context.
Impact
This allows arbitrary command execution in the Renovate runtime during Gradle Wrapper updates. Depending on deployment, this may expose credentials/tokens available to the bot and may allow an attacker to modify repositories or access internal resources reachable from the Renovate environment.
Remediation
Upgrading to Renovate 42.68.5 (2025-12-31) fixes this issue, and closes out other risks of shell evaluation for commands run by Renovate.
If using the composer, yarn (v1) or flux managers, please upgrade to 42.74.5 (2026-01-08), as there were follow-up fixes to keep these managers working.