Packages / @opennextjs/cloudflare / Security
OpenNext Cloudflare: Cache interception can bypass middleware protection for encoded paths
Affected releases · @opennextjs/cloudflare
- 1.x1.0.0 – 1.20.1Fixed in 1.20.2
- 0.6.x and older0.3.0 – 0.6.6No fix, no longer updated
On 1.x, the newest line:
npm install @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.20.2Affected
1.0.0 – 1.20.1
79 releases
Fixed
1.20.2 – 1.20.12
11 releases, latest
Not affected
0.0.3 – 0.2.1
5 releases
Affected
0.3.0 – 0.6.6
40 releases
Is your project affected?
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What happens
Summary
When cache interception is enabled, @opennextjs/cloudflare can interpret percent-encoded paths differently during middleware matching and cache lookup.
An encoded request may fail to match authorization middleware, then be decoded into the cache key of a protected route. The cached response may consequently be returned without invoking the middleware.
enableCacheInterception is disabled by default.
Impact
A remote unauthenticated attacker may retrieve cached content from routes intended to be protected by middleware.
An application is affected when it:
explicitly enables
enableCacheInterception;relies on middleware for access control; and
has a matching cached route.
Details
Middleware matching previously used the encoded request pathname, while cache interception decoded the pathname before selecting a cache entry.
For example, consider an application with:
middleware matcher
/admin/:path*;middleware returning
401 Authentication requiredfor/admin;a statically generated, cached
/adminroute; andcache interception enabled:
export default defineCloudflareConfig({
incrementalCache: staticAssetsIncrementalCache,
enableCacheInterception: true,
});An attacker can request:
GET /%61dmin
The encoded pathname does not match /admin/:path*, so the authorization middleware is not invoked. Cache interception then decodes %61dmin to admin and may return the cached /admin response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK x-opennext-cache: HIT Protected content
Malformed paths exposed an additional inconsistency. For example:
GET /%61dmin/%ZZ
The previous implementation decoded each segment independently. It decoded %61dmin to admin but retained the malformed %ZZ segment, allowing cache lookup to continue using a partially decoded pathname.
Patches
The fix aligns encoded-path handling across middleware matching and cache lookup, and rejects malformed paths instead of partially decoding them. See the upstream fixes in opennextjs-aws#1199 and opennextjs-aws#1200.
Users should upgrade to @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.20.2 or later.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible for an application:
Disable cache interception by removing
enableCacheInterception: true.Enforce authorization inside protected route handlers rather than relying exclusively on middleware.
Reject encoded paths for protected routes at a trusted proxy before they reach the Worker.
Adding individual encoded matcher variants is not a complete workaround because pathnames can have multiple equivalent encodings.