---
title: "GHSA-p498-v437-472g: humanfs: Recursive copy follows symlinked files and copies data from outside the source tree"
description: "Moderate severity. humanfs: Recursive copy follows symlinked files and copies data from outside the source tree. Affects @humanfs/node; fixed in 0.16.8."
url: https://inlinr.com/advisories/GHSA-p498-v437-472g
lang: en
---

[Packages](https://inlinr.com/packages) / [@humanfs/node](https://inlinr.com/packages/@humanfs/node) / [Security](https://inlinr.com/packages/@humanfs/node/security)

Moderate Vulnerability GHSA-p498-v437-472g Published 2 Sep 2026

# humanfs: Recursive copy follows symlinked files and copies data from outside the source tree

Your version 

Affected releases · [@humanfs/node](https://inlinr.com/packages/@humanfs/node)

- 0.16.x 0.16.0 – 0.16.7 Fixed in 0.16.8
- 0.15.x and older 0.7.0 – 0.15.0 No fix, no longer updated

On 0.16.x, the newest line:

```
npm install @humanfs/node@0.16.8
```

Every release on a timeline

1. Affected

0.7.0 – 0.16.7  
18 releases
2. Fixed

0.16.8 – 0.17.0  
2 releases, latest

20 stable releases of @humanfs/node, oldest to newest.

## What happens

Summary

[@humanfs/node](https://inlinr.com/packages/@humanfs/node) does not treat symlinks as a separate case during copy operations. A symlink placed inside an attacker-controlled source tree can make `copyAll()` read and copy the contents of any file readable by the process, even when that file is outside the directory being copied.

Details

The Node implementation exposes symlink state through `list()`, but `copyAll()` ignores it. During recursive copies, every non-directory entry is passed to `copy()`, which delegates to `fs.promises.copyFile()`.

On Node, `copyFile()` dereferences symlinks. As a result, a symlink inside the copied tree is handled as if it were an ordinary file, and the destination receives the contents of the symlink target rather than a copy of the link itself.

That breaks the expected boundary of a directory copy. A caller can point `copyAll()` at a seemingly self-contained directory and still end up copying data from elsewhere on the host filesystem if the source tree contains attacker-supplied symlinks.

The same dereference behavior also affects `copy()` when the source path itself is a symlink.

PoC

```
import { NodeHfs } from "@humanfs/node";
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import path from "node:path";
import os from "node:os";

const root = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "humanfs-"));
const src = path.join(root, "src");
const dst = path.join(root, "dst");
const secret = path.join(root, "secret.txt");

await fs.mkdir(src);
await fs.writeFile(secret, "TOPSECRET");
await fs.symlink(secret, path.join(src, "link.txt"));

const hfs = new NodeHfs();
await hfs.copyAll(src, dst);

console.log(await fs.readFile(path.join(dst, "link.txt"), "utf8"));
// TOPSECRET
```

Impact

If an application uses `copyAll()` or `copy()` on attacker-controlled paths, a symlink can be used to pull arbitrary readable host files into the copied output. In practice, that can turn a normal workspace copy, export, or packaging step into a file disclosure primitive.

## How it is exploited

Exploitable with local access, with no account and a user to do something.

- **Confidentiality**: high
- **Integrity**: none
- **Availability**: none

CVSS:4.0/​AV:L/​AC:L/​AT:P/​PR:N/​UI:P/​VC:H/​VI:N/​VA:N/​SC:N/​SI:N/​SA:N

## References

- [Reference](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/security/advisories/GHSA-p498-v437-472g "https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/security/advisories/GHSA-p498-v437-472g")  
github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/security/advis…
- [Fix commit](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/commit/22bbaa4487a3e6c1197ca619840de4615d0c3404 "https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/commit/22bbaa4487a3e6c1197ca619840de4615d0c3404")  
22bbaa4
- [Package](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs "https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs")  
github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs
- [Reference](https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/releases/tag/node-v0.16.8 "https://github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/releases/tag/node-v0.16.8")  
github.com/humanwhocodes/humanfs/releases/tag/n…

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